

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

Y 4.F 76/1:P 92/12

International Aspects of the Presid...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 3, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

78-077 CC

WASHINGTON : 1994

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-044397-0

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

Y 4. F 76/1:P 92/12

International Aspects of the Presid...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 3, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

78-077 CC

WASHINGTON : 1994

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-044397-0

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, *Chairman*

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut	BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TO M LANTOS, California	WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey	JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California	TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York	OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida	HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York	DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa	CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota	DAN BURTON, Indiana
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York	JAN MEYERS, Kansas
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California	ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania	ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey	CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey	DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey	DAVID A. LEVY, New York
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio	DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia	LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington	EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida	
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio	
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida	
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland	
DON EDWARDS, California	
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana	
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio (Vacancy)	

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, *Chief of Staff*
JO WEBER, *Staff Associate*

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

TOM LANTOS, California, *Chairman*

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana

ROBERT KING, *Staff Director*

MICHAEL ENNIS, *Republican Professional Staff Member*
THEODORE H. HIRSCH, *Professional Staff Member*
BETH L. POISSON, *Professional Staff Member*

CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Hon. Lee P. Brown, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy	2
APPENDIX	
Hon. Lee P. Brown, prepared statement	27
Excerpt from report entitled "Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse: 1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy", Office of National Drug Control Policy, September 1993	42

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:33 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights) presiding.

Mr. LANTOS. The Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights will come to order.

The subcommittee meets today to examine the international aspects of President Clinton's National Drug Control Strategy. As we all know, the President released an interim strategy on October 20.

I would like to use this hearing as a first step in what I hope will be a very cooperative effort between the executive branch and the Congress in developing an implementation plan for the strategy which will maximize the very limited foreign assistance resources and our wealth of talent.

I think it will be useful to discuss some of our past efforts and strategies, particularly with respect to the Andean initiative, which over the last 5 years has been the main focus of our overseas narcotics control strategy. By examining the lessons learned from that initiative and other programs, I would hope that we can begin the process of determining what programs and policies have the best chance of having a measurable effect on the flow of illegal narcotics to the United States. I am pleased that Director Brown has had an opportunity to visit the Andean countries and will be able to discuss his impressions of U.S. programs in those countries.

The interim strategy says all the right things. It stresses that we need to focus our efforts on democratic institution building and to sponsor projects that have regional applicability and emphasizes that the operations of drug trafficking organizations are a profound threat to U.S. national security. Our job now is to try and develop and implement programs that address these statements.

Given the shrinking resources of the United States for overseas programs, I am afraid we are going to have to learn to do more with less. Two important aspects of this, which I hope our witness will address, will be diplomatic efforts to increase the engagement of our friends and allies around the globe who are increasingly being affected by narcotics trafficking, particularly cocaine traffick-

ing. We will also need to ensure that U.S. Government agencies involved in combating narcotics trafficking are not duplicating each others efforts.

I want to welcome Dr. Brown to his first appearance before the subcommittee in his new position as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Dr. Brown has had a long and distinguished public career in enforcement, and brings an enormous amount of knowledge and insight on the subject of narcotics to this new position. I very much look forward to working with Dr. Brown on this matter of utmost importance to the American people.

I would like to just highlight some of his major career steps to indicate the breadth of knowledge, experience and insight he brings to this office. Prior to being confirmed as director of this office, Dr. Brown was a professor of criminology at Texas Southern University and director of the University's Black Male Initiative Program. He also served as the New York City Police Commissioner from 1990 to 1992; as chief of police of Houston, Texas from 1982 to 1990; and as Atlanta's public safety commissioner from 1978 to 1982. I am very pleased to note that Dr. Brown began his distinguished career in law enforcement in 1960 as a patrolman in my neighborhood of San Jose, California. After 8 years in that capacity, he moved to Portland, Oregon and established the Department of Administration of Justice at Portland State University.

He received his Doctorate in Criminology in 1970; he and I share the pleasure of having received our doctorates at the University of California at Berkley. He also has a Masters of Criminology from the University of California, a Masters in Sociology from San Jose State University, and a Bachelors in Criminology from Fresno State. He is the past president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and is involved in a host of professional and community organizations. He is also the recipient of a very impressive list of awards that he richly, richly earned.

Before turning to Dr. Brown, I would like to thank the committee staff who worked on this hearing: Beth Ford; Kelly Fawcett, our legislative fellow; Dr. Bob King; Mike Ennis, from the Republican staff; Jo Weber; and Jon Peterson, our intern.

Dr. Brown, we are delighted to have you. Your prepared statement will be entered in the record in full and you may proceed any way you choose.

STATEMENT OF HON. LEE P. BROWN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my pleasure to be here with you today.

As you mentioned, the Interim National Drug Control Strategy, which the President released on October 20, 1993, provides a new direction and focus for implementing the Administration's international anti-drug policies. The international section of the Interim Strategy is the product of a very comprehensive review of our international strategy, involving all of the relevant agencies of the executive branch, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the National Security Council, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Intelligence Community. Under the auspices of a Presidential Review

Directive, this review required hundreds of man-hours and produced over 1,000 pages of documentation.

The result is a well-balanced approach that includes support to our allies, attacking criminal syndicates and effective interdiction activities. The Administration's international narcotics control programs are consistent with the overall approach of the interim strategy to aggressively respond to hardcore drug use and the rising tide of violence throughout the nation.

Mr. Chairman, last month I attended the funeral of 4-year-old, Launice Smith, from the District of Columbia, who was killed in a cross-fire while watching a ball game at a public park here in the District. This precious child could have been my grandchild, or the child or grandchild of anyone in this room. This type of occurrence is morally reprehensible.

Serious drug abuse, especially hardcore drug use, is fueling this crisis of violence. Data released recently by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration showed a 10 percent nationwide increase in drug-related hospital emergency room episodes between the years 1991 and 1992. Cocaine-related emergencies increased by 18 percent, and heroin-related episodes rose by an alarming 34 percent.

As we all know, drug use fosters a culture that accepts violence and serious risk to oneself and others as a natural way of life. It creates communities where employment is scarce, school drop-out rates are high, decent health care is inaccessible, HIV/AIDS is rampant, violence and property crime rates are high, and social services are ineffective.

The Presidential Review Directive for International Counternarcotics is the classified companion document that outlines the President's policies for the international arena, as well as the interagency structure for developing, coordinating and implementing international counter-drug strategies and policies. The directive which, I might add, the President signed today, concludes that our Government must treat as a national security threat the operations of international criminal narcotics syndicates. This will require an extraordinary coordination by civilian and military agencies engaged in national security affairs.

The President signed this decision directed today that gives me, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, new, broad authorities to coordinate the national anti-drug effort. For international counternarcotics, the President has directed me to oversee and direct all counter-drug policy development and implementation; to mediate interagency disputes; to conduct periodic reviews; to appoint a coordinator for interdiction operations; to oversee a counternarcotics interagency working group, chaired by the Department of State; and have all agencies report to me by December 15 on how they will implement the President's guidance.

I am required to submit to the President by January 15 of next year a consolidated report on how the Administration will implement the President's International Counter-Drug Policies. This policy directive treats the operations of international criminal narcotics syndicates as a national security threat required, as I said, an extraordinary and coordinated response by civilian and military agencies engaged in national security.

It changes emphasis from the past concentration largely on stopping narcotic shipments to a more evenly distributed effort across three programs: assisting institutions in other nations, destroying narco traffic and organizations, and practicing more selective and flexible interdiction programs near the U.S. border in the transit zone and in source nations.

When I assumed my position as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the President made clear to me that he wanted to support those countries that demonstrated the political will to tackle the drug trafficking problem. He also wants his Administration's strategy to concentrate on those programs that work and eliminate those that do not. Our international strategy will accomplish these objectives.

Holding on to the programs because they make us look tough, but actually accomplish little, fails to be honest with the American people who want a drug strategy that effectively responds to the realities of the drug problem America faces.

Since becoming director, I have travelled to Latin America and the Caribbean to discuss the drug problem with foreign leaders and looked at many of our cooperative counternarcotics drug programs. During these trips, I discussed our new strategy with the Presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and the Prime Minister of the Bahamas. I have been to the poppy fields of Colombia, the coca growing areas of the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru and the Chapare in Bolivia. I have visited Operation Bahamas, Turks, and the Caicos Islands in the Bahamas, and met with the Navy and Coast Guard leaders responsible for interdiction in the Caribbean.

Our review of previous drug strategies and programs has led us to a number of conclusions that are reflected in our interim strategy. I am very comfortable that our new strategy properly reflects my own personal assessment of how we should proceed.

Traditionally, we have separated U.S international drug control programs into distinct areas of source country control programs and interdiction activities in the transit zones.

In the mid to late 1980's, the Federal Government decided to take significant action to address a major increase in the flow of cocaine to the United States. The Customs Services and the Coast Guard received infusions of resources to address the problem. When the Defense Department was instructed by the Congress to get directly involved in the counter-drug area, it did so with the energy and resources that it believed were necessary to meet its mission requirements. Over time, we have developed a better understanding of where we can effectively apply our interdiction resources. Nearly a decade of experience, however, has taught us that interdiction is not a silver bullet.

It is clear from my review that our international programs—interdiction, crop control, intelligence, alternative development, judicial reform, and law enforcement—are interdependent and mutually supportive endeavors that need to be advanced as an entity, rather than a collection of seemingly separate individual programs. We can and will adjust the program mix to meet new challenges.

The shift in our emphasis to source countries is predicated on the conclusion that, despite our efforts—the efforts of our military, the efforts of our civilian law enforcement agencies—the availability of

drugs at home has not been significantly reduced enough to disrupt local drug markets. In addition, changes in drug smuggling patterns and the increased capacities of the United States and host nations to attack drug trafficking in the source countries further justify this shift.

Last year, we and our allies seized around 338 metric tons of cocaine, which cost the traffickers billions of dollars in potential profits. In the end, however, drug availability on the street did not decline in America. These potential losses have led the traffickers to expand their use of maritime and commercial transportation, which has resulted in a noticeable drop in trafficker air flights across the Caribbean and through Central America. Entrances to the smuggling pipeline are reaching deeper into the source countries, and the pipeline, itself, is becoming less visible.

In our new strategy, we are responding to this evolutionary development. Changes in cocaine production has made traffickers and their operations more vulnerable in the source countries, so we are concentrating our resources there.

Thus, our strategy calls for a controlled shift of emphasis from the transit to the source countries. We use the term controlled shift because we anticipate that this move could precipitate a responsive adjustment by the cartels, which requires that we be prepared to respond in kind. Because interdiction is an expensive endeavor, we anticipate that our reduced efforts in the transit zone will help finance expanded efforts in the source countries.

To this end, the Department of Defense announced last Thursday that it has issued new policy guidance redirecting its counter-drug program to emphasize support to nations battling cocaine cultivation and processing, while shifting away from the transit zone interdiction. DOD support will be aimed at enhancing the host nations' professional capabilities and fostering regional support. Intelligence collection and analysis will target the cocaine cartels.

The cartels and other international drug trafficking organizations are highly vulnerable. Not only do traffickers fear the loss of profit, as we have learned in Colombia, they also fear arrest, they fear conviction, and they fear the seizure of their assets. Our ability to collect intelligence and build cases against major traffickers, as in DEA's kingpin strategy, has improved considerably over recent years, and we will exploit this growing capacity.

Drug trafficking is a criminal activity that threatens democratic institutions. It fuels terrorism and human rights abuses, and undermines economic development. In the major source and transit countries, therefore, counternarcotics must be an integral part of our foreign policy and must be pursued with the same long-term, worldwide commitment that the U.S. devotes to the promotion of democracy and economic development. Again, we should not expect to progress very far on the counternarcotics front unless we also progress on the others.

In Peru, for example, the insistence on the part of our foreign policy that the Fujimori Government continue on the path toward democracy and the protection of human rights has enhanced narcotic control efforts in this most important coca source country. Over the course of the recent year, we have seen Peru conduct

three free and open elections, undertake a significant effort against corruption, and improve their record on human rights.

At the same time, our narcotics control efforts have led to the closing by Peru of municipal and clandestine airstrips used by the traffickers, the deployment of the Peruvian Air Force against suspected drug trafficking aircraft, and the expansion of chemical control efforts. While this is not to say we have the type of program we need in Peru, I respectfully submit that we are on the right path to establishing such an undertaking.

Similarly, in Burma, progress on the human rights front and democratization is directly linked to the progress on the narcotics control front. Progress on reducing the cultivation of opium and heroin conversion in Burma will come about as the United States and the international community prods the current ruling regime to restore basic freedoms in their country.

Since assuming my position, I have met with a number of leaders from around the world. In every case, I am advised of the need to mobilize greater international cooperation, because the scope and complexity of the drug problem, along with the resources required to deal with it, are too great for any one country. In this endeavor, the United States must continue to provide strong leadership, or little progress will be made. As a nation, we cannot ignore this responsibility, and our strategy reflects this.

Last week, I addressed the General Assembly and had fruitful meetings with the United Nations Drug Control Program officials. But, I regret that Mr. Gilman's schedule prevented him from joining me at the General Assembly because I know this committee shares my view that the legislative and executive branch be united on the drug issues in world bodies. The U.N.'s role in and contribution to counternarcotics is growing, and we will place priority on supporting this effort.

The UNDCP, for example, is playing a greater and more effective role than it did in the past. In Burma and Afghanistan, where we have very little influence, they are actively engaged. Accordingly, in fiscal year 1993, we increased our contribution to UNDCP to \$6.2 million and plan to increase it again this year.

We will continue to work closely with the Organization of American States and its International—or Inter-American—Drug Abuse Control Commission, the Dublin Group and other international bodies to address the problems of drug trafficking and use. In this regard, the strategy will give increased emphasis to prodding international financial institutions to revise their policies to reflect the threat posed by drugs and expand the pool of resources available to international narcotics control activities.

In the past, we have tended to look at program management and efficiency as appropriate measures. While such assessments often told us whether the dollars were spent correctly, the inventories properly managed, or desired training accomplished, they did not tell us how well individual programs contributed to the accomplishment of our strategy. Since many of our programs entail the development of host national capabilities, their effectiveness is often difficult to measure and often a long term in coming.

These challenges, however, do not make measures of effectiveness any less important or necessary. The President has made it

a priority that this area be addressed. In addition to the traditional measures of drug availability, we need to look at the long-term objectives of our programs, and evaluate our success in terms of improving the availability of source and transit nations to better control their territory and combat the drug trade. As part of this effort, we will look at goals such as dismantling major trafficking organizations, strengthening judicial capability, promoting sustained economic growth, and participating in multilateral law enforcement efforts.

The President's Directive identifies the interagency processes to consist of developing, coordinating and implementing international counternarcotics policies, strategies and programs. My role in overseeing counternarcotics policy development and coordination will be greater than that given any of my predecessors. State will chair an interagency working group on counternarcotics. I will oversee the activities of this working group and will have the authority I need to mediate interagency disputes, manage the implementation of the strategy, appoint an interdiction coordinator who will report to me, and make appropriate budget recommendations to the President for the implementation of the international strategy.

The Presidential Decision Directive calls for a full review of the heroin strategy within 120 days. We are extremely concerned about the increase in opium production and heroin trafficking worldwide, particularly in Pakistan and Burma, and the increase in heroin-related activity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As a result, the Drug Enforcement Agency has directed 25 percent of its kingpin activities against heroin trafficking organizations.

In addition, we recognize that the heroin problem must be addressed on a multilateral basis. For example, while 50 percent of the heroin seized in America is of Southeast Asian variety, close to 70 percent of the heroin seized in Europe is of Southwest Asian variety. Further, it is obvious that because of the limited influence the United States has in some major heroin source nations, it is imperative that we work through the United Nations and other multilateral forums to curtail the worldwide trafficking and abuse of heroin. This will be a major focus of our new heroin review. We will aim to improve the ability of law enforcement and judicial institutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to be better equipped to respond to the heroin threat.

As the entire committee is aware, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 1994 made significant reductions to State's counternarcotics budget, as well as to Foreign Military Financing, Economic Support Funds, and International Military Education and Training. The obvious concern is whether there is sufficient funding to carry out the interim strategy. The President shares my concern and, at his direction, we are reviewing our funding requirements and potential sources of funding. And, once this review is complete, we will come back to the Congress, if necessary, and seek its support in any required reprogramming of fiscal year 1993 and 1994 funds. I believe that under this approach, we will be able to sustain our current major international activities and begin to implement the President's strategy.

However, I must caution the committee that any further reductions in the Department of Defense drug interdiction account beyond the levels proposed by the Senate in the DOD appropriations bill could seriously impair our ability to carry out our strategy. I ask the help of this committee in this effort.

Similarly, looking toward the fiscal year 1995 budget, it will be important to get our international budget back on the levels proposed in the President's fiscal year 1994 budget. This will provide the funding levels necessary to achieve the goals in our international counternarcotics effort.

One final note: demand reduction efforts will be an integral element in our overall international drug strategy. U.S. drug control agencies will encourage the expansion of drug abuse treatment and prevention programs in source and transit nations. Successful drug enforcement efforts are more likely when drug use is strongly condemned by these countries.

In conclusion, the interim strategy and the Presidential Directive provides the foundation for developing and implementing changes in U.S. counter-drug efforts. Our international drug control efforts aim at getting at the source of illicit drug flows in the most cost efficient and effective manner, and reduce the level of hardcore and serious drug use in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, before I respond to questions, let me take just one moment to respond directly to comments made publicly recently by my dear friend, the former administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Let me point out Mr. Bennett is wrong; I mean, totally and absolutely wrong.

The President is fully committed to addressing the drug problem in America and he has signaled his commitment in many ways. The Interim Drug Strategy we recently released is only one. While it departs in some key ways from what has been done in the past, and that may make Mr. Bennett somewhat uncomfortable, the interdiction is there; the resolve is there.

What is more important, the needed support is there for me to get the job done. The President has made me a member of his Cabinet, and through the PDD, has given me increased authority to better integrate our interdiction in foreign programs. Further, he has taken steps to ensure that all drug control departments and agencies understand the importance of coordination and cooperation interplay. I sit at the Cabinet table. My views and opinions are listened to, and that is a major change in addressing the issue of drugs in America.

Let me say, I have the utmost respect for Mr. Bennett. I believe he is sincere. But on this issue, he is sincerely wrong. The PDD that the President just signed places more emphasis on attacking the major trafficking organizations and less on the old system of body counts.

Mr. Bennett also says treatment is doomed to failure; that there are no successful treatment modes for heavy cocaine and heroin users. I disagree with him, and my opinion is based on what I personally know to be true: treatment does work; and many, many Americans stand ready to testify to that fact. The President, himself, has said as much and his opinion is based on personal and heartfelt family experience.

That is not to say that treatment is easy. There are not any guaranteed silver bullets. There must be dedication and hard work for successful treatment. And the entire issue of treatment and demand reduction must be moved to center stage as the President has done. Under this Administration, a drug problem would no longer be viewed in isolation. It is a major part of our other domestic policy issues, such as health of the economy, such as violence, such as health care, such as family and community stability, and such as community empowerment.

So in closing, this administration has taken a new approach to dealing with this very serious problem. We are not abandoning our commitments to aggressively attack the drug problem either here, at home or abroad. We are simply adopting a new and I think more reasonable and responsive course of action, one that I am sure over the next years will prove to be effective.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be delighted to respond to the questions of the committee.¹

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Brown, let me first thank you for a comprehensive and outstanding opening statement. I have many questions for you, but before I get to those, I want to give my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman, who is the co-chairman of the permanent U.S. congressional delegation to the European Parliament, an opportunity to make an opening statement and ask whatever questions he would like to ask.

Let me just say having watched Congressman Gilman on this issue for the entire period I have served in Congress, there is no Member of Congress who has been more persistent, diligent, concerned and effective in dealing with this issue. And having seen him deal with this issue with our joint meetings with the European Parliament, I want to pay public tribute to him for repeatedly bringing this to the attention of the 12 nations of the European Community. It was his perseverance and commitment that helped enormously in putting the drug issue up at center stage with the European Community.

So let me yield to my friend from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your kind remarks. Welcome Dr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. It is good having our drug director here with us. We met informally by way of the media recently, and we look forward to working with you. We were present when you were sworn in and we were elated that the President had selected someone of your caliber and background to take on the drug problem.

I want to commend our Chairman, Mr. Lantos, and a ranking member, Mr. Bereuter, for putting this on the schedule. I think this is our first opportunity to dig into the strategy with Dr. Brown. And I believe that Dr. Brown would agree with us that one of the most serious problems in our Nation today is our epidemic of violence and crime, most of it fed by drugs, and drug-related crime, filling up our prisons. I think it has been estimated that a good 60 to 70 percent of our prison population today are there because of drug-related crimes. A poll taken last month by CNN

¹The prepared statement of Dr. Brown appears in the appendix.

shows that 94 percent of Americans see drugs as one of the most critical, important causes of crime. And just this week, Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders stated that violence, drug-related violence, has cost our Nation some \$13 billion, \$500 million in medical bills just last year. And she said that the chief cause of all of that violence is illegal drugs.

And, yet, after 9 months in office, the Administration has labored mightily, but I dare say has given birth to a mouse of a drug strategy, and I regret that I have to take issue with the strategy. The rhetoric sounds good, but the substance squeaks. The interim strategy focuses on rehabilitation and treatment, but provides no new resources. At the same time, the Administration has slashed funds for international eradication and for interdiction. Programs to eradicate cocaine in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru have been cut by 32 percent. And I am pleased, Dr. Brown, that you took the time to visit those areas so that you could have a first-hand view of what the problems are there.

The Pentagon's anti-drug operations are going to be cut by \$200 million according to a report in the *Washington Post* recently. And the inevitable result will be more and more cheaper drugs on the street. That will overload and undermine the very treatment programs that you want to focus on, because today's casual user becomes tomorrow's hardcore abuser.

And I believe Dr. Brown agrees that we must fight the drug war on all fronts to reduce both supply and demand: through eradication at its sources; interdiction, when it gets into the mainstream and arteries of distribution; enforcement, when it reaches our shorelines; and reducing demand through education, treatment and rehabilitation. All of those have to be fought simultaneously on all fronts, reducing both supply and demand. And doing so effectively, of course, is going to require adequate funding, and not cuts of 80 percent in your office and 30 percent in the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters.

Recently when we visited Thailand and Taiwan at a narcotics conference, some of our DEA people, our Drug Enforcement people, told us they are running on fumes; that they do not even have enough to keep their vehicles out there on the street daily, and had to furlough them one day a week in order to be able to meet the budgetary needs. And hopefully, they did not have to go pursue a drug trafficker on the day in which they had to garage the cars.

In Colombia—if the Colombian cartels were to be listed today on the New York Stock Exchange, and regrettably, some are listed in *Forbes* as some of the most wealthy people in our Nation, I think Wall Street would be issuing a buy signal for them after reading the interim strategy.

So, Chairman, I have some questions and I will try to be brief. I know I have overstated my opening remarks and I do not want to take too much time from the committee.

REDUCTION IN SIZE OF ONDPC

Dr. Brown, your own office staff, I understand, has been cut from 146 down to 25. Is that a correct figure?

Mr. BROWN. It is down to 25. Can I respond to that?

Mr. Gilman, I am delighted that we are in agreement on one thing, and that being that violence and crime is a very serious problem in America, affecting virtually every family in this country. I do not know any family that is spared this problem.

As you know, I have spent my entire career in law enforcement. I have been there. I have been an undercover narcotics officer.

Mr. GILMAN. And a career we are all quite proud of.

Mr. BROWN. I was a cop on the street, and I have run police departments throughout this country. And so, what I am in the process of doing now is attacking what I think is America's number one domestic problem.

A reading of our interim strategy would tell you very clearly that what we are saying is essentially what your committee, the Select Committee has voted on on many occasions: a comprehensive approach to address the problem of drugs in America, and many people have testified before the Select Committee that you have spent so many years working on. That is what this strategy gives you.

I am surprised that you are not embracing the strategy because you are the ones who have helped in bringing us to where we are today. At the same—

FUNDING FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS

Mr. GILMAN. Well, we would be embracing it more forcibly if we saw that there was some true dedication to the objectives of what we are all seeking, and that is a drug-free nation, drug-free communities. If we saw the funding that was out there and if we saw that you were intensely interested in battling on all of these fronts to come up now with a strategy that focuses attention on trying to do something about the hardcore abuses as though that is the main objective, I think leaves a lot to be desired.

Mr. BROWN. I think a clear reading of the strategy would tell you that it is comprehensive. We say in the strategy we will deal with enforcement, we will deal with education, we will deal with prevention, we will deal with interdiction, and we will deal with our international component. It is a comprehensive strategy that is focused.

I may also add that the President asked in his budget for a record \$13 billion for the drug control initiative from the Federal Government. The President did not cut the budget; the Congress cut the budget. We do not have the final authority. The Congress has the authority.

Mr. LANTOS. If I may interrupt at this point, Dr. Brown. You made the point I was going to make myself in just a moment. It is the Congress that cut the budget, not the President. And at a broader level, I have to tell my good friend from New York that I profoundly deplore the partisan character of his remarks.

If there ever was an issue which is not a Democratic or Republican issue, it is the fight against drugs and crime. It is a fact that the drug epidemic exploded in this country during the course of the last 12 years during the Reagan and Bush administrations, which I refrained from mentioning. And I personally think it is preposterous to blame an Administration that has not yet been in office a full year for the drug problems of this nation. Any individual with a touch of fairness will say that the last 12 years must recognize its *mea culpa, mea maxima culpa*. It was from 1980 to 1992

that the drug epidemic swept this nation at a time when we had 12 years of Republican Presidents in the White House.

And I simply, with all of my affection for my friend, will not let him get away with blaming the Clinton administration for the drug problems of the United States. I would hope, and my opening remarks clearly indicated, that we do not approach this thing on a partisan basis. But if it is approached on a partisan basis, it will be responded to in a very forceful fashion.

Dr. Brown has been in office a very short time. He is the last person responsible for the drug crisis in this country. His job is to deal with it. This Administration was sworn in on January 20. The drug problem has been with us from 1980 on, and before that. And I think that it is very helpful not to add to the shrill partisan rhetoric on this issue, but to deal—

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS [continuing]. Excuse me, I will finish—but to deal with the substantive issues. The substantive issues are how do we deal with what I consider to be the nation's number one problem—on that I agree with you—the combination of drugs and crime, on a truly bipartisan basis. That is the purpose of this hearing, and I am happy to yield to my friend.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was no intention to make this a partisan issue. Over the years, our Select Committee and our colleagues have criticized one administration after another, whether it be Republican or Democratic administrations, for not fulfilling their responsibility to our Nation in trying to wage an effective battle against the narcotics traffickers and the narcotics abuse that is out there.

My statement was not a partisan statement. It was intended to try to focus attention on a wrong direction that we are going and I hope that we can encourage the Administration to turn around and provide the kind of necessary funding that is needed by Dr. Brown. We are not criticizing Dr. Brown. He is new to the office. But, we want him to have the wherewithal in order to effectively do battle out there on the streets of our cities.

May I continue with my questioning, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. LANTOS. Of course.

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

Mr. GILMAN. Some of the critics of interdiction efforts, and we hear a lot of that these days, want us to cut back those efforts and are ready to say that interdiction does not work. They cite the fact that there are still large quantities of drugs on the streets, and those critics want us to disprove a negative by saying that interdiction does not work.

Let me put the interdiction issue in another way. How much more cheap and unlimited quantities of drugs would be out there on our streets if we sent the signal to the traffickers that they do not have to worry about being caught transporting drugs into our Nation? And I am asking you what are your thoughts about should we or should we not be moving away from interdiction?

Mr. BROWN. Let me make one correction from one of your previous statements.

Mr. GILMAN. I would be pleased to hear your thoughts.

Mr. BROWN. My office budget was not cut. It is up about \$11 million. We have all of the security needs we need.

Let me just also echo something that you and I talked about when we were on television. I believe very strongly, I want to take just a minute to make this very clear, that this is not a political issue. The political talk did not stop the little 4-year-old girl from being killed in the District. The political talk does not keep the elderly citizens from staying in their homes when they want to walk the streets. The political talk does not stop the thousands of people who are killed in this country. And I would hope that we would move on on this working together to address what I consider to be the number one problem in America.

Mr. GILMAN. We look forward to working with you, Dr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. It is the number one problem in America from my perspective. I am out there on the streets. I talk to the people. They are suffering from the problem of crime and violence that comes about as a result of the drug problem. And I would hope that that would be the convene which we will be able to work.

Mr. GILMAN. One of the problems that we have found in the lack of funding for your office and for the International Narcotics Matters Office—and incidentally, it was my amendment that put money back into that office in our committee—we did not hear from the Administration about their needs for additional funding. As far as I am concerned, I have yet to hear from the Administration about their needs for the additional funding to make it a more effective program.

Mr. BROWN. I worked extremely hard in working on those issues. In fact, in the treatment area, we were successful in getting some of the funds back and the block grant monies. In fact, we got \$40-some million more than the President asked for. It is not correct to say that we did not work on getting the monies back; we did. And in some instances, we had success; other instances, we did not have success.

But in answer to your question, I believe that interdiction is a very important part of what we are about. It will continue to be part of our strategy. It is not my intent nor do I intend to open up the borders for the Escobars of the world. We are learning from our past experiences. We have seen over the years that, as we develop new strategies, the drug cartels are very flexible. They will move. And the smart thing to do is for us to be flexible and move as well.

Right now, our strategy calls for moving into the source countries. We think that will make a difference. If you look at the vastness of our border, it is like we are on the border trying to get the bees as they come across the border. To us, it makes more sense to go to the beehive, and that is the source countries. If we can dry it up there, it makes it much easier to deal with interdiction based on intelligence.

But under no means do we intend to abandon our borders. We were able to interdict some over 300 tons of drugs. That is about the same amount that comes into this country each year that is consumed by Americans. That means that the drug cartels have to produce twice the amount of drugs just to satisfy the needs of this country. Interdiction helps us in terms of getting the intelligence information. Each time we interdict, we learn something. Forty-

thousand plus arrests were made in some of the source countries by virtue of the help that we have given them.

Interdiction will continue to be a part of our strategy, but our strategy is comprehensive. It deals with all aspects of what we believe is important to address the drug problem.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I hope that you would let us hear from you about your thoughts of providing adequate funding for our drug enforcement people who are out there on the firing line; for the need—you are emphasizing the need to go to the source countries; to provide some decent funding for the Office of International Narcotics Matters, an agency that has been cut by 30 percent; and, indeed, to enhance the work of your office by providing adequate funding.

We look forward to working with you, but do not fail to reach out to us for your needs.

Mr. BROWN. Well, I am going to take you up on—

Mr. GILMAN. So far, we have not heard from the Administration about those needs. You mentioned a \$13 billion proposal. That is the first I have heard of that \$13 billion proposal.

Mr. BROWN. That was the President's budget that came to the Congress. Again, the President did not cut his budget.

Mr. GILMAN. But who is advocating the drug budget?

Mr. BROWN. I am.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, we would welcome hearing from you.

Mr. BROWN. And I will take you up on your offer. As I have said on television, I want you to be a partner with us. This is not an issue for Republicans and not an issue for Democrats.

Mr. GILMAN. It never has been in our Select Committee—

Mr. BROWN. This is an American issue.

Mr. GILMAN [continuing]. Shared by Congressman Rangel, who is a very active democratic, and I was a ranking member as Republican, and we worked together in a bipartisan effort. And we did not hesitate to criticize one administration after the other, whether they be Republican or Democrat, for failing to address this matter in a very proper and fully funded approach.

Mr. BROWN. And I am going to take you up on your offer. I will come to you and ask you to help me—

Mr. GILMAN. I look forward to working with you.

Mr. BROWN [continuing]. Get the funds necessary to get the job done.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NARCOTICS AS A FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE

Mr. LANTOS. Let me begin my questioning with the issue of where the fight against narcotics fits into our overall foreign policy. Much has been said in recent years, Dr. Brown, about weaving the issue of narcotics into the fabric of our foreign policy. Given the global nature of this problem, and the very real threat that organized crime and narcotics trafficking pose to our democracy, I believe this is a very necessary approach. But, it seems to me that we have been able to do this only where narcotics is really the only issue of strategic concern to the United States—such as in the case of Colombia or Bolivia. In most other cases, take our European allies with respect to money laundering and precursor chemical pro-

duction or with countries like Laos, where we are concerned with POW-MIA issues—it seems that we, as a country, have been reluctant to make narcotics a priority issue in our foreign policy.

I am not arguing that it should be the single issue, obviously. But, I do believe that it needs to be better integrated into our bilateral relations across the board. I wonder if you would comment on this general issue of how to weave the struggle of narcotics into the fabric of our foreign policy.

Mr. BROWN. We are doing that, and I will continue to be a strong advocate for making that happen. In the President's Decision Directive, he has indicated that the drug problem is seen as a national security issue. So when we go to Latin America and address some of our foreign policy goals and concerns, such as democracy, such as economic development, such as human rights, included in there is also the issue of drugs because they are all tied together. We cannot have democracy if the drug cartels control the countries. We cannot have a good economic development or judicial system where drugs control the country.

So, it is not only in our best interest, but it is also in the best interest of the source countries we are concerned with, or the transit countries, to make sure that drugs—the narcotics problem share the same status, the same goal as some other foreign policy goals for this country. I shall continue to be a strong advocate of that. The President supports that, and it is contained and reflected in our Decision Directive.

FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Brown, one area with which I am particularly familiar where I believe narcotics has not played an important role in our foreign policy is the former Soviet Union. Now as I understand it, the Freedom Support Act—which is our aid program for the former Soviet Union—gives the Administration authority to provide assistance for anti-narcotics programs. To my knowledge, none of that money has been proposed to begin to address this issue. I am concerned about this, particularly since there is an escalating level of criminal activity, a large portion of it drug related, in the former Soviet Union. There are, as you know, ties between Russian crime groups and international criminal organizations, such as the Sicilian Mafia and the Colombian cartels. And it seems to me that narcotics trafficking and crime pose a very serious danger to the very fragile democratic structures developing in the former Soviet Union.

Can you enlighten us as to whether or not there is any thought being given by the Administration to dealing with the anti-narcotics issue with respect to the former Soviet Union?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir, there is. I have had preliminary conversations with the director of the United Nations drug control program. He is very much aware, and our conversations suggest that we will continue to work with him on addressing that issue. Thought has been given to it, discussions have taken place, and more activities will take place in that regard in the future.

CERTIFICATION

Mr. LANTOS. I want to ask a question about the issue of certification, if that is all right with you. One of the most controversial aspects of the law over the years with respect to narcotics control is the requirement for the Administration to make an annual certification on cooperation with the United States by the major drug producing and transit countries. There has been a great deal of criticism concerning the way this has been handled. Very often in previous administrations, there was a national interest waiver if other foreign policy interests were deemed to be more important than fighting narcotics. What is the attitude of the Clinton administration on the issue of certification?

Mr. BROWN. We have to look at our foreign policy collectively. There are a number of things that are important, as I mentioned earlier. The development of democracy, the economic development, the human rights, corruption, all of those are issues. Now what we are in the process of doing—that I am in the process of doing is looking at the whole issue of certification because there is some need for flexibility. For example, if we take a particular country that may be weak on human rights, it is important that we work with them on the drug issue. And so, looking at it in that context will give us the ability to have a more effective certification process.

So, we are taking some positive steps to make narcotics performance an ongoing process, not just a one time scramble at the end of the year as a means of addressing the problem. We have to continue to place great emphasis on it because the drug issue impacts some of the other goals we wish to achieve through the certification process.

Mr. LANTOS. You see, I would be much more pleased if administrations, both this one, past ones and future ones, would say, "No, they are not cooperating with us." But because there is an overriding national interest, we, nevertheless, give them a certification. Far too often what we have had has been a certification, when everybody knew the certification was unwarranted. Can you give us an assurance, Dr. Brown, that you will be very precise in this matter? Because, we clearly understand that occasionally there may be overriding factors and we are prepared to live with those. But, we somehow find that it sticks in our throats when a country is certified as fully cooperating with us on narcotics matters, when everybody knows that is not the case.

Mr. BROWN. That has been one of the flaws in our previous certification process, the pass/fail nature of the certification. As a result of that, having a new classification, that is certification with exclamation, gives us a vehicle to put those countries marginally performing with friendly countries, a notice that they will be denied certification, unless their cooperation improves. That gives us what I referred to earlier, that is the flexibility to make effective democratic—democracy possible, effective decisions based upon looking at the totality of that country.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Brown, let me ask somewhat of a philosophical question. Suppose a creature were to arrive today from Mars or the moon, and turns on television, read the newspapers, listen to the radio. At the end of 3 days, the creature would be asked what are the two most important issues in the United States. The answer clearly would be NAFTA and the Packwood diaries.

Now, I suspect you and I agree that neither of those issues will be as determinative of the kind of society you, I and our children will live in as our effectiveness in dealing with the fight against narcotics and related crime. I fully understand that the attention span of both the public and the Congress is very limited, and you need constantly dramatic developments, like the Len Bias case, which then refocuses the attention on the problem of drugs.

I remember in the wake of the Len Bias tragedy, I addressed every single one of the high schools in my district, and the auditoriums were jammed and there was a fever pitch of interest in the subject. It is all gone. People have become immune to the notion of both crime and drugs because they are with us, they are intense, they are heavy, they are serious. But, in your work, you really need to have a sustained, high level of interest and concern by the American people. Have you thought of enlisting Hillary Clinton in this effort?

Mr. BROWN. I think in addition to the messages you suggested, our visitor would also be prepared to go back tomorrow because of the violence that he would see on television. If he watched television in the lead story—and the first four or five stories, you will see violence. We know that that is fueled by the drug issue, particularly hardcore drug use. And there is a need to have a sustained effort to keep that on the minds of the American public.

As I talk to people on the streets throughout America, they are very much aware of the violence problem. They are very much aware that the drug problem is fueling violence, not only in our inner cities, but increasingly in our suburbs and our rural areas as well. And certainly, someone such as the First Lady could do the country a great service by taking this on as a major issue, just as she has with the health care reform issue. She is someone who brings a great deal of knowledge, talent and skills to any issue that she takes on, and I would be delighted to see her champion the cause of reducing drugs in America; thereby, reducing violence.

Mr. LANTOS. She has done one hell of a job in focusing attention on the health care issue.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct. And I have had preliminary discussions with the First Lady around the issue of treatment. I think she should be applauded for her effort to make sure that treatment would be part of the health care reform package. And thus, when passed by Congress, for the first time in the history of America, substance abuse will be part of the national health care system, which will go a long ways to our bridging the gap between those who need treatment now and our ability to provide the slots for them. And so, if she would, it would be a welcomed addition to our efforts to deal with controlling drugs in America, and I would certainly urge and hope that she would take it on.

Mr. LANTOS. I will try to assist you in persuading her.
Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING

Mr. LANTOS. You know, you deal with so many agencies. And in most, if not all of these, intelligence gathering, intelligence sharing, and intelligence analysis are an important part of your operation. Yet, we find that there are competing databases and different information systems. There is also a sort of a proprietary interest problem present in some agencies.

This is not unique to the drug field. This subcommittee had a series of hearings on how some of the people who were engaged in the World Trade Center bombing received visas to the United States. And, we discovered that the various agencies involved in granting visas had very little, very ineffective, very outmoded and much delayed intelligence sharing capabilities. Would you care to tell us how your plans are developing so that you have a coordinated and meaningful intelligence system helping you?

Mr. BROWN. Under an ideal situation, a country such as America would have a unified system to address the drug problem. There would be a central command for the operational components of the efforts to deal with drugs. There would be a central intelligence gathering apparatus. Unfortunately, we do not have the ideal; whether we have some 50 different agencies involved in the drug control effort, with numerous intelligence gathering operations.

This is recognized. In fact, as recent as yesterday, I had a 2-hour meeting on the intelligence issue. It is my intent to work with relevant Cabinet members, the Attorney General, Treasury Secretary and others to focus our attention on how do we make sure we have coordination, no duplication for the intelligence gathering to deal with the serious drug problem in America. There will be a major effort that we will be undertaking within a short period of time.

Mr. LANTOS. I am very pleased to hear that, Dr. Brown. Because without good intelligence, you really are handicapped beyond words.

I would like to turn now to Congressman Smith and I want to welcome him to the hearing.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Dr. Brown, I apologize for missing most of your testimony. In New Jersey, we had a very big election last night and I did not sleep very much, but—

Mr. LANTOS. Moreover, it came out wrong. [Laughter.]

FUNDING

Mr. SMITH. We are very pleased in our State. We have some new direction in the State of New Jersey as it relates to a whole host of issues, including crime.

But, I do have one question I would like to ask you, if you would answer. When he was in town recently, President Sanchez de Tozada of Bolivia was very critical of the efforts the Administration was making to cut the budget in the area of drug interdiction. He made the point, and I would quote, "Instead of maintaining that budget, the aid budget is being cut by one-third." He went on to say, "this is not very creative or imaginative," and, again, was very critical of efforts to curtail programs at a time when we have not

made substantial progress the way we would all like to see. Certainly, in terms of narcotics control, you chill some of what otherwise would have been progress result of those efforts.

And I happen to believe, and I share the views of my two colleagues, the chairman and the distinguished ranking member, that this has to be a full-court press. I am all for treatment. I represent the city of Trenton, which has a major league drug problem, and I am all in favor of drug treatment. But interdiction efforts should not go by the wayside. And when you get the precedent of one of our major allies saying that "don't cut us," that raises alarm bells with me in terms of the specific strategy as it relates to Bolivia, and the larger strategy as it relates to other nations. Would you respond?

Mr. BROWN. Sure. I agree with him. I agree with you. We should not have cut it. What is being considered by the Congress is not what the President asked for. The President did not ask that his budget be cut. The President asked for, as I stated earlier, a record \$13 billion for drug control efforts.

I have been to Bolivia. I have met with the President. In fact, I spent 4 hours with him talking about what we can do. I am very impressed with the will and the resolve that is being put together there under his leadership to address the problem. I was very impressed that they have a long-term plan to help address the problem. And we need to provide the continuous help that we have been giving, rather than less.

We have a long-term problem and, therefore, we must have a long-term commitment. They are doing things in terms of crops substitution, for example. But to do that, we have to also rebuild or build an infrastructure to get the substitute crops to the market. We need roads. We do not have the roads in Bolivia. We wanted to do that. The drug dealers will fly in and get their crop, but the farmers cannot get their crops to the market without the roads.

And so, I think the point that I want to make is that the Administration did not cut the budget that it asked for. It does not have the authority. The Congress has the final say. And that is why we come to you again and ask for your help to assist us in carrying out what we all agree should be the right direction. We must continue to help Bolivia. We have made tremendous progress. If we do not continue to do that, that progress is going to be lost and that would be a detriment, not only to our country, but also to the Bolivians.

Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Brown, we commend you for taking on the statement that we need the budget, and the budget should not have been cut and it was done by the Congress. But there was no advocacy out there by the Administration. There was no lobbying effort by the Administration to make sure that budget would not be cut. And when we see an international effort, the INM cut by 30 percent without the Administration making one statement about it, that leaves something to be desired.

You have stressed going into the source country. In order to go into the source country and do what we should be doing, we should be spending a substantial amount and reducing that supply. And

a lot of us recognize that that is an important thrust in this whole battle. And if you need the money to do it, then come up and shout about it.

We have not heard very much from the Administration about the need for these critical funds. There was a time when you were appointed, a good statement was made by both the President and by yourself of the need to do some things to fight this battle. But, we have not heard many major statements since that time.

Mr. BROWN. I have personally spoken to the President on this issue when the budgets were being cut. I know that he did take action to try to get some of the funds restored. I know personally, I have been on the Hill talking to people trying to get the funds restored, and I will continue to do that. The screaming that you are calling for will be continuous from my part. I will be an advocate for getting the resources necessary to do the job.

I know the President is going to support me in getting the resources necessary to do the job. I have talked to him just in the last week three times about the drug issue. I have brought the drug issue to the Cabinet table. I have brought the drug issue to the Domestic Policy Council table. It is something that we are continuously looking at. When we talk about the crime bill, we talk also about the drug issue. So, there is a commitment to deal with the problem. But it is worth repeating that the Administration did not cut the President's request for drug control funds. The Congress did, not the Administration.

Mr. GILMAN. All right. I just hope that you will eliminate the perception that this is not a priority issue by the Administration.

Mr. BROWN. Let me make it very clear, it is a priority.

Mr. GILMAN. We look to you for that kind of leadership.

Mr. BROWN. And I will provide that for you, and I appreciate your offer to support us in getting the resources. I will be back to you.

Mr. GILMAN. I think you will find a great deal of support here in the Congress.

Mr. BROWN. You shall hear from me.

Mr. GILMAN. And anytime you need funding for battling for drugs—I, in the past, have not heard the Congress turn down those urgent requests, and we hope you will take those up.

Mr. BROWN. I certainly will.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. SMITH. I would just emphasize what Mr. Gilman has said, as he has led—when we did have a Select Committee on Narcotics, he has been absolutely tenacious over the years in badgering Republican and Democratic administrations to be poignant on this issue. And I do not think there is any partisanship in what he says. He is very concerned—

Mr. BROWN. I know he has been involved in this for years.

I appreciate his knowledge in it and certainly will continue to ask for his support on getting the job done.

PERU

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Brown, if you could just tell us what your assessment is of the efforts being made in Peru with the Fujimori administration. We have had hearings on progress as it relates to human

rights and other issues in Peru. And it seems as if every time one airstrip is closed down, there are 15 others to replace it. And despite perhaps goodwill efforts, interdiction efforts fall far short. If you could touch on that issue.

Mr. BROWN. As you may know, I took a trip to Peru and met with the President to talk about what efforts they have underway there. And they are making progress. We have seen them close down some of the municipal airstrips, closed down the clandestine airstrips. They are putting a lot of resources in dealing with the major problems there, such as the insurgency, as well as the drug trafficking. And they are making progress.

What I did not find, however, was a long-term plan. There are a lot of things that need to be done. They are even making progress on the human rights issue and the corruption issue. There is a lot more that needs to be done. My advice to the President was that he needs to develop a long-term plan. Bolivia has such a plan, for example, and that could serve as a model for what needs to be done. I have gone out into the coca leaf growing areas. I have seen the eradication program or the substitute crop programs that are taking place there. And so, there is a great deal of effort. And some of their seizures have increased over a period of time. Efforts are being made there.

So what we must do is, consistent with the will of the Congress, with their concerns, make sure that we do not look at this as an issue we can drop. We are making progress. We must continue to work with them in ways that are feasible, consistent with our concerns about what goes on there. But progress has been made and we should continue to work with them as we can to not lose the gains that have occurred over the last few years.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I yield back to balance my time.

Mr. LANTOS. I just have a couple of additional questions.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Mr. LANTOS. The first one relates to measuring the effectiveness of the international anti-narcotics program. For years, there has been criticism that you are spending an enormous amount of money, but we really do not have the tools to measure objectively the effectiveness of the program. How do you deal with that issue, Dr. Brown?

Mr. BROWN. One of the more difficult aspects of this business or even the business I was in before, that is police work, is measuring the effectiveness. The overall effectiveness has to be measured in terms of reduction of the consumption of drugs in America. Now, how do we do that? We have to also look at what we are doing in terms of our strategy.

If we look at our international program, we have more than one aspect of concern. Have we been successful, for example, in supporting and advancing democracy? Have we been successful in eradicating the crops? Have we been successful in crop substitution? Have we been successful in our seizures? I am in the process right now of developing those measurements for us. As I see it at this point in time, we will continue some of the traditional measurements. We cannot get away from that. We need to look at, are

we making arrests; are we making seizures; what is the consumption—all of that.

But in addition, we have to look at what is our overall objective in addressing the goals in some of the source countries, and they include expanding what we have done in the past, but in not neglecting some of the things that we have been doing in our traditional measurements. We will come up very shortly with a new set of measures, and I will be delighted to share with you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, as soon as we are finished with that task.

ANDEAN INITIATIVE

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Brown, I know you touched on the Andes earlier, and I know some of the things that are going on in this field are very good and productive. What would be the shortcomings or the deficiencies in the current U.S. programs in the Andes?

Mr. BROWN. I am forced to look at each of the countries separately.

Mr. LANTOS. Please do.

Mr. BROWN. During my trip, for example, I started off in Panama and that is a transit country—a transhipment country. And there, we were able to make progress in getting a public commitment from the President of the country at the time to push to get their legislative body to approve the Vienna Narcotics Treaty. And hopefully, that will take place. We were able to get them to make a public commitment to administratively pass regulations that deal with currency that comes in and out of the country, currency control. I think that is a step forward. We have asked them to push for tight money-laundering legislation. That was a step forward when they publicly committed to do that. So, we see some progress there. If they could carry out those recommendations that we left with them, I think we would make progress in dealing with the money laundering, a problem in that country, and the transhipment problem.

We move on to Colombia. I think Colombia has probably demonstrated more political will than any of the Latin America countries in dealing with the problem. That is evident by the number of lives that have been lost, both law enforcement as well as civilian, lost in the battle. We have seen a great improvement in their judiciary system with our assistance. Now, we find that many of the cases that come before the court, we get convictions and sentencing. That risk was not there prior to the efforts that we put forward. We have seen crop substitutions programs going on there. I had a chance to go into the coca fields and find out the things that they are doing there. We have seen also the eradication of the poppy there. That is going on. I think the political will and resolve there is very strong and it is extremely important that we continue to do so.

We move on to Peru. We find that is probably the more difficult of the Latin American countries. I have discussed that in some length before. But, we need to also recognize that we made some progress. I might add that I think that once Colombia is successful in recapturing Escobar, that the same amount of resource and effort will then go in dealing with the other cartels, such as the Cali cartel, in addressing the drug problems. In Peru, I think the main

thing we need is a long-term plan, so we know what direction we are taking, we know what strategies we need, and what steps we need to take to achieve our goal. They have demonstrated a lot of effort, a lot of will, resolve to address some of the problems, dealing not only with the narco trafficking, but also insurgency and the terrorists there. And we find that the insurgency or the terrorists are now also engaging themselves in narco trafficking to support their efforts. My suggestion was a long-term plan so they could carry that out.

If we move on to Bolivia, I think we have a great opportunity for a great success story there if they are given the support that we can and have given them in the past. They have a long-term plan. They know what they are doing. Their recently elected President has the resolve and political will to move ahead. I think they have done a lot in terms of eradication, probably as much as they can do at this point in time. Their success now creates a problem for them. And so, if they are going to be continuously successful, the things that they are doing now, like crop substitution—bananas, and pineapples, and passion fruit and things of that nature—must continue. We also talked about maybe some other crops that they could cultivate. But for all of that to happen, they also have to have the infrastructure, the roads to get the crop to the market. Our help in that area would be essentially crucial.

I think at some point in time, we might find that Bolivia can do as Mexico has done, has taken over the drug issue themselves, with less support from America. I think that is a great potential there because of the political will, the leadership of their President, and some of the success that we have seen over the last few years.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, very much. Mr. Gilman.

SPLIT BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAMS

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Brown, in focusing on the hardcore abusers and more attention to be given to the treatment, rehabilitation, are you suggesting that a greater chunk of the budget, then, to overall drug budget be redistributed to about 50 percent for demand reduction and 50 percent for supply?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir, I have not made that suggestion. I have not attempted to, nor do I intend to, try to develop an artificial division of the funds: 50-50, 30-70. What I am in the process of doing is using our interim strategy to develop our budget and our full-blown strategy that we will submit to Congress come February. I believe very strongly that policy must drive budget, and not have budget drive strategy. I do not see where an arbitrary division of funds would be helpful as far as public policy is concerned.

I think we need more resources. We certainly need more resources in the treatment area. That does not mean we take resources from our law enforcement efforts. I do not intend to support, under any circumstances, a reduction in our law enforcement efforts. That is critically important. People suffer on the streets. We have to go out and do what we can.

We will continue to have interdiction. That is extremely important. We have to continue to have an international program. When we say all of that, it says we need more resources to get the job

done. That is what I am going to fight for and ask for your help in doing.

Mr. GILMAN. Our former budget, I believe last year, was about a 70 percent allocation for reduction of supply, and about 30 percent for treatment and rehabilitation. Are you suggesting any change in that ratio?

Mr. BROWN. Well, we will put out the Clinton administration's budget, and as I said, we are in that process right now. We have the foundation; that is our interim strategy. And what we will ultimately end up doing is seeing a budget that reflects the strategy. If that calls for more resources in order to do the treatment and prevention, that is what I will ask for.

But, I want to also make a point that I do not look at just a line item on the budget, and say that has narcotics and say that is our total drug control program. I see putting the 100,000; or what is requested in the crime control bill, the 50,000 more cops on the street is part of our drug control program under the concept of community policing. As you know, in New York, it worked. We implemented community policing in New York City, and after 1 year, we saw crime go down in every index category. That had not happened in 36 years.

I see our empowerment and enrichment zones where we go into a neighborhood or into a community and use the combined resources of the Federal Government, State and local governments to make a difference in those areas. The problems that we address there, such as inadequate education, joblessness, homelessness, all relate to drugs. So to the extent we can address them collectively, we also address the drug problem.

I see health reform as part of our drug control program, to the extent we can get drug treatment as part of our health reform package. That is part of our drug control program. I see education reform as part of it. I see what Secretary Cisneros is doing in terms of public housing as being part of our being part of our drug control program.

So as we score all of this, I think you will see a change in the percentages of the split we have right now. But when we look at all of that, we still, I believe, do adequately address the treatment and prevention area need for more funds.

We want to make sure that we also have treatment within the criminal justice system. If we just think of the fact that we arrest in this country tens of thousands of people every year, many of those arrested, as has been pointed out, have a drug problem. It makes good sense and it is good policy to have treatment for those individuals. Coercive treatment has shown to be effective. People who are in jails and prisons with a drug problem should be treated. If they are under supervised release, they should be treated.

So all of that is part and parcel of what I see to be our drug control program. It is not narrow. It is not just supply and demand. It is what do we need to do to get the job done; what resources do we need to get the job done. And I will be banging on your door and everyone else's door to get those resources.

EMPHASIS OF TREATMENT PROGRAMS

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Brown, your new emphasis on hardcore drug users, will that take away your attention to the casual abusers?

Mr. BROWN. By no means. I am very pleased that we have seen a substantial reduction in the occasional drug users. Today, we have about 11.4 million people that are the occasional drug users; far, far too many. The 11.4 million people feed into the fuel that creates the problems to begin with. I happen to believe that anyone with a social conscience cannot use drugs even occasionally.

Some of the works of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America has been very successful. I have been meeting with them to continue that effort. The Drugs Don't Work Program has been very successful in dealing with the reduction of drugs in the workplace in our large companies. We have not had the same success in our small companies, and I will continue to work with them to reduce the casual drug use of those individuals. That is important.

I point out the workplace because many of the potential or many of the users of drugs occasionally are working. And if we can get to them in the workplace with an effective educational program, as has been shown to be effective, we can make even more progress. There are also parents that can take that same message into their home and prevent the first-time drug users.

No, we do not intend to let up on any front. We have not seen the same success in the hardcore drug user. That group represents about 20 percent of the cocaine using population, but they consume between 70 and 80 percent of the cocaine that comes in this country. And we have to do something about that. We have to make sure we focus our efforts on where we find the problem putting together our interim strategy.

We have looked at the problem. We have looked at what was being done. We have looked at what success we have had. We have found that with regards to the hardcore drug user, we have not at all been successful. We find also that we have an epidemic of violence in America right now, and affecting literally every family. And we have to do something about ending the senseless violence. Now, we feel that to do that, we have to understand that there is a direct relationship between hardcore drug use and violence, and that is why we are attacking the hardcore drug user.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me just once again reiterate, Dr. Brown, that we are here to help you in your effort, both here in this committee and in some of our other sub-committees that address the drug problem. But, we want to hear more from you and from the Administration of the needs. And when you see some cuts that are under way, reach out and we will all advocate with you the need to provide the kind of funding that is so important in this battle.

Please take another look at the cuts in the International Narcotics Matters. You talk about the necessity for going to the source country, that is the agency that goes to the source country. Take a look at our DEA budget, where they are complaining about running on fumes out there and do not have the kind of wherewithal to do the job. And take a look, too, at the need for more administra-

tion people shouting about the crisis that we are confronted with on the drug problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Dr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. You can be guaranteed that I will reach out to you and ask for your assistance.

Mr. LANTOS. I want to thank my friend from New York for his very effective questioning. We have gotten Congressman Gilman to sign on with you. So, if we will only get Hillary Clinton to join Mr. Gilman and me, you will be in great shape.

Dr. Brown, I am very grateful to you and very appreciative of the time you have spent on this issue. It was a very impressive first visit and we hope to have you back many times.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gilman. Thank you, very much.

Mr. LANTOS. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE LEE P. BROWN

**DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY**

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

NOVEMBER 3, 1993

(27)

Mr. Chairman, the Interim National Drug Control Strategy, which the President released on October 20, 1993, provides a new direction and focus for implementing the Administration's international anti-drug policies. The international section of the Interim Strategy is the product of a very comprehensive review of our international strategy, involving all of the relevant agencies of the Executive Branch, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the National Security Council, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Intelligence Community. Under the auspices of a Presidential Review Directive, this review required hundreds of man-hours and produced over a thousand pages of documentation.

The result is a well-balanced approach that includes support to our allies, attacking criminal syndicates and effective interdiction activities. The Administration's international narcotics control programs are consistent with the overall approach of the interim strategy to aggressively respond to hardcore drug use and the rising tide of violence throughout the nation.

Mr. Chairman, last month I attended the funeral of four year old Launice Smith who was killed in a cross-fire while watching a

ball game at a public park here in the District of Columbia. This precious child could have been my grandchild or the child or grandchild of any one in this room. This type of occurrence is morally reprehensible.

Serious drug abuse, especially hard-core drug use is fueling this crisis of violence. Data released recently by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) showed a 10 percent nationwide increase in drug-related hospital emergency room episodes between 1991 and 1992. Cocaine-related emergencies increased by 18 percent, and heroin-related episodes rose by 34 percent.

Drug use fosters a culture that accepts violence and serious risk to oneself and others as a natural way of life. It creates communities where employment is scarce, school drop-out rates high, decent health care inaccessible, HIV/AIDS rampant, violence and property crime rates are high, and social services ineffective.

1. Presidential Decision Directive for Counternarcotics

The Presidential Decision Directive for International Counternarcotics is the classified companion document that delineates the President's policies for the international arena, as well as the interagency structure for developing, coordinating and implementing international counter-drug strategies and

policies. The directive concludes that our government will treat as a national security threat the operations of international criminal narcotics syndicates. This will require a extraordinary coordination by civilian and military agencies engaged in national security affairs.

When I assumed my position as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the President made clear to me that he wanted to support those countries that demonstrated the political will to tackle the drug trafficking problem. He also wants his Administration's strategy to concentrate on those programs that work and eliminate those that do not. Our international strategy will accomplish these objectives.

Holding on to programs because they make us look "tough" but actually accomplish little fails to be honest with the American people who want a drug strategy that effectively responds to the realities of the drug problem America faces.

Since becoming Director, I have traveled to Latin America and the Caribbean to discuss the drug problem with foreign leaders and looked at many of our cooperative counternarcotics drug programs. During these trips, I discussed our new strategy with the Presidents of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia and the Prime Minister of the Bahamas. I have been to the poppy fields of Colombia, the coca growing areas of the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru and the

Chapare in Bolivia. I have visited Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos Islands (OPBAT) in the Bahamas and met with the Navy and Coast Guard leaders responsible for interdiction in the Caribbean.

Our review of previous drug strategies and programs has led us to a number of conclusions that are reflected in our interim strategy. I am comfortable that our new strategy properly reflects my own assessment of how we should proceed.

2. Comprehensive and Balanced Approach: A Realistic Look at Interdiction

Traditionally, we have separated U.S. international drug control programs into distinct areas of source country control programs and interdiction activities in the transit zones.

In the mid to late 1980's the Federal government decided to take significant action to address a major increase in the flow of cocaine to the United States. The Customs Service and the Coast Guard received infusions of resources to address the problem. When the Department of Defense was instructed by the Congress to get directly involved in the counter-drug area, it did so with the energy and resources that it believed were necessary to meet its mission requirements. Over time we have developed a better understanding of where we can effectively apply our interdiction resources. Nearly a decade of experience, however, has taught us

that interdiction is not a silver bullet.

It is clear from our review that all our international programs - - interdiction, crop control, intelligence, alternative development, judicial reform, and law enforcement -- are interdependent and mutually supportive endeavors that need to be advanced as an entity, rather than a collection of seemingly disparate individual programs. We can and will adjust the program mix to meet new challenges.

The shift in our emphasis to source countries is predicated on the conclusion that, despite valiant efforts by our military and civilian law enforcement agencies, the availability of drugs at home has not been significantly reduced enough to disrupt local drug markets. In addition, changes in drug smuggling patterns and the increased U.S. and host nation capabilities to attack drug trafficking in the source countries further justify this shift.

Last year we and our allies seized around 338 metric tons of cocaine, which cost the traffickers billions of dollars in potential profits. In the end, however, drug availability on the streets did not decline. These potential losses have led the traffickers to expand their use of maritime and commercial transportation, which has resulted in a noticeable drop in trafficker air flights across the Caribbean and through Central

America. Entrances to the smuggling pipeline are reaching deeper into the source countries, and the pipeline itself is becoming less visible. In our new strategy, we are responding to this evolutionary development. Changes in cocaine production has made traffickers and their operations more vulnerable in the source countries, so we are concentrating our resources there.

3. Controlled Shift of Emphasis

Thus, our strategy calls for a controlled shift of emphasis from the transit to the source countries. We use the term controlled shift because we anticipate that this move could precipitate a responsive adjustment by the cartels, which requires that we be prepared to respond in kind. Because interdiction is an expensive endeavor, we anticipate that our reduced efforts in the transit zone will help finance expanded efforts in the source countries.

To this end, the Department of Defense announced last Thursday that it has issued new policy guidance redirecting its counterdrug program to emphasize support to nations battling cocaine cultivation and processing while shifting away from transit zone interdiction. DoD support will be aimed at enhancing the host nations' professional capabilities and fostering regional support. Intelligence collection and analysis will target the cocaine cartels.

The cartels and other international drug trafficking organizations are highly vulnerable. Not only do traffickers fear the loss of profit, as we have learned in Colombia, they fear arrest, conviction, and seizure of their assets. Our ability to collect intelligence and build cases against major traffickers, as in DEA's Kingpin strategy, has improved considerably over recent years, and we will exploit this growing capability.

4. Counternarcotics and Foreign Policy

Drug trafficking is a criminal activity that threatens democratic institutions, fuels terrorism and human rights abuses, and undermines economic development. In the major source and transit countries, therefore, counternarcotics must be an integral part of our foreign policy and must be pursued with same long-term, worldwide commitment that the U.S. devotes to the promotion of democracy and economic advancement. Again, we should not expect to progress very far on the counternarcotics front unless we also progress on the others.

In Peru, for example, the insistence on the part of our foreign policy that the Fujimori Government continue on the path toward democracy and the protection of human rights has enhanced narcotics control efforts in this most important coca source country. Over the course of the recent year, we have seen Peru conduct three free and open elections, undertake a significant effort against corruption, and improve their record on human

rights. At the same time, our narcotics control efforts have led to the closing by Peru of municipal and clandestine airstrips used by the traffickers, the deployment of the Pervian Air Force against suspect drug trafficking aircraft, and the expansion of chemical control efforts. While this is not to say we have the type of program we need in Peru, I respectfully submit that we are on the right path to establish such an undertaking.

Similarly, in Burma progress on the human rights front and democratization is inextricably linked to progress on the narcotics control front. Progress on reducing the cultivation of opium and heroin conversion in Burma will come about as the United States and the international community prods the current ruling regime to restore basic freedoms in their country.

5. Mobilizing International Cooperation

Since assuming my position, I have met with a number of leaders from around the world. In every case, I am advised of the need to mobilize greater international cooperation, because the scope and complexity of drug problem, along with the resources required to deal with it are too great for any one country. In this endeavor, the U.S. must continue its strong leadership role, or little progress will be made. As a nation, we cannot ignore this responsibility, and our strategy reflects this.

Last week I addressed the United Nations General Assembly and had

fruitful meetings with the U.N. Drug Control Program (UNDCP) officials. I regret that Mr. Gilman's schedule prevented him from joining me at the General Assembly because I know that this Committee shares my view that the Legislative and Executive Branch be united on the drug issues in world bodies. The UN's role in and contribution to counternarcotics is growing, and we will place priority on supporting this effort. UNDCP, for example, is playing a greater and more effective role than it did in the past. In Burma and Afghanistan, where we have had very little influence, they are actively engaged. Accordingly, in FY 93 we increased our contribution to the UNDCP to \$6.2 million and plan to increase it this year.

We will continue to work closely with the Organization of American States (OAS) and its Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Dublin Group, and other international bodies to address the problems of drug trafficking and use. In this regard, the strategy will give increased emphasis to prodding international financial institutions to revise their policies to reflect the threat posed by drugs and expand the pool of resources available to international narcotics control activities.

6. Measures of Effectiveness

In the past, we have tended to look at program management and efficiency as appropriate measures. While such assessments often

told us whether the dollars were spent correctly, the inventories properly managed, or desired training accomplished, they did not tell us how well individual programs contributed to the accomplishment of our strategy. Since many of our programs entail the development of host nation capabilities, their effectiveness is often difficult to measure and often a long time in coming.

These challenges, however, do not make measures of effectiveness any less important or necessary. The President has made it a priority that this area be addressed. In addition to the traditional measures of drug availability, we need to look at the long-term objectives of our programs, and evaluate our success in terms of improving the ability of source and transit nations to better control their territory and combat the drug trade. As part of this effort, we will look at goals such as dismantling major trafficking organizations, strengthening judicial capability, promoting sustained economic growth, and participating in multi-lateral law enforcement efforts.

7. Interagency Responsibilities

The President's Directive identifies the interagency processes to consist of developing, coordinating and implementing international counternarcotics policies, strategies, and programs. My role in overseeing counternarcotics policy development and coordination will be greater than that given my

predecessors. State will chair an interagency working group on counternarcotics. I will oversee the activities of this working group and will have the authority I need to mediate interagency disputes, manage the implementation of the strategy, appoint an interdiction coordinator who will report to me, and make appropriate budget recommendations to the President for the implementation of the international strategy.

8. Heroin Strategy

The Presidential Directive calls for a full review of the heroin strategy within 120 days. We are extremely concerned about the increase in opium production and heroin trafficking worldwide, particularly in Pakistan and Burma, and the increase in heroin-related activity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As a result, the Drug Enforcement Agency has dedicated 25% of its kingpin activities be directed against heroin trafficking organizations.

In addition, we recognize that the heroin problem must be addressed on a multilateral basis. For example, while 50% of the heroin seized in the United States is of Southeast Asian variety, close to 70% of the heroin seized in Europe is of Southwest Asian variety. Further, it is obvious that because of the limited influence the United States has in some major heroin source nations, it is imperative that we work through the United Nations

and other multi-lateral forums to curtail the worldwide trafficking and abuse of heroin. This will be a major focus of our heroin review. We will aim to improve the ability of law enforcement and judicial institutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to be better equipped to respond to the heroin threat.

9. Adequate Budget Support

As the entire Committee is aware, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY 1994 made significant reductions to State's counternarcotics budget, as well as to Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The obvious concern is whether there is sufficient funding to carry out the interim strategy. The President shares my concern and, at his direction, we are reviewing our funding requirements and potential sources of funding. Once this review is complete, we will come back to the Congress, if necessary, and seek its support in any required reprogramming of FY 93 and 94 funds. I believe that under this approach we will be able to sustain our current major international activities and begin to implement the President's strategy.

However, I must caution the Committee that any further reductions in the Department of Defense Drug Interdiction account beyond the levels proposed by the Senate in the DoD Appropriations Bill

could seriously impair our ability to carry out our strategy. I ask the help of this committee in this effort.

Similarly, looking toward the FY 95 budget, it will be important to get our international budget back to the levels proposed in the President's FY 1994 budget. This will provide the funding levels necessary to achieve the goals in our international counternarcotics effort.

One final note: demand reduction efforts will be an integral element in our overall international drug strategy. U.S. drug control agencies will encourage the expansion of drug abuse treatment and prevention programs in source and transit nations. Successful drug enforcement efforts are more likely when drug use is strongly condemned by these countries.

In conclusion, the interim strategy and the Presidential Directive provides the foundation for developing and implementing changes in U.S. counter drug efforts. Our international drug control efforts aim at getting at the source of illicit drug flows in the most cost-efficient and effective manner, and reduce the level of hard-core and serious drug use in the United States.

I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.



OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500

BIOGRAPHY OF LEE P. BROWN

Lee P. Brown is Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate with a unanimous vote and was sworn-in to the cabinet-level posting on June 21, 1993.

Prior to his confirmation as ONDCP Director, Dr. Brown was a Professor of Criminology at Texas Southern University and Director of the University's Black Male Initiative Program. He also served as New York City Police Commissioner from 1990 - 92, as Police Chief of Houston, Texas from 1982 - 90, and as Atlanta's Public Safety Commissioner from 1978 - 82.

Dr. Brown began his distinguished career in law enforcement in 1960 as a patrolman in San Jose, California. After eight years in that capacity, he moved to Portland, Oregon and established the Department of Administration of Justice at Portland State University.

In 1972, he joined Howard University in Washington, D.C., becoming Associate Director of the Institute for Urban Affairs and Research. He also held the academic rank of Professor of Public Administration and Director of Criminal Justice Programs.

Dr. Brown returned to Portland in 1975 to serve as Sheriff of Multnomah County, a department comprised of all the county's criminal justice agencies.

Dr. Brown received a Doctorate in Criminology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1970; a Masters in Criminology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1968; a Masters in Sociology from the San Jose University in 1964 and a Bachelors in Criminology from Fresno State University in 1961.

Dr. Brown is a past President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and is involved in a number of professional and community organizations.

The recipient of a number of law enforcement awards over the years, Dr. Brown was most recently awarded the Cartier Pasha award from Cartier International in 1992. In 1991, he was named Father of the Year by the National Father's Day Committee.

The author of many articles and papers on police management, community policing, crime and the criminal justice system, Dr. Brown is also co-author of the book Police and Society: An Environment for Collaboration and Confrontation.

42
3 9999 05982 089 2

EXCERPT FROM REPORT ENTITLED "BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUG ABUSE: 1993 INTERIM NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY", Office of National Drug Control Policy, September 1993

Providing International Leadership: Support for Anti-Drug Policies Around The World

Although much remains for the United States to do at home, we will not neglect our close partnership with a growing number of countries around the world that share our commitment to combatting drug trafficking.

Lee Brown


International narcotics control is a major U.S. foreign policy objective, particularly in the leading drug source, transit, and money laundering countries. Left unchecked, the illegal drug trade's corrupting influences will undermine efforts to promote the development of democratic systems and the rule of law, economic stability and growth, human rights, and a clean environment.

The effectiveness of our domestic supply and demand reduction efforts will be undermined if drugs flow unabated. We must, therefore, continue to work with, and offer our full support and cooperation to other nations, especially the major source and transit countries, that demonstrate the political will and program commitment to combat the drug trade. We will urge other nations to undertake more action on their own by reinforcing the concept that it is in their best interests to do so. Strong diplomatic leadership will help deliver this message and spark foreign governments to take action.


The great majority of illicit drugs found on the streets of the United States are produced overseas, and the major criminal organizations that produce and smuggle them are located in foreign countries.ⁱ Without international cooperation, our

demand and supply reduction efforts to curb drug availability and use will be undermined. To ensure progress, U.S. foreign policy will pursue short- and long-term initiatives at bilateral and multilateral levels.

Total Potential Cocaine Production, 1988-1992



Source: Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.



STEP ONE

Prioritize International Efforts

We will continue to treat the flow of drugs to this country and the operations of foreign drug trafficking organizations as a threat to U.S. national security. Cocaine remains our primary threat, although heroin warrants serious concern. To counter this threat, we will ensure a coordinated response by U.S. supply reduction agencies and the strongest cooperation between the United States and other countries to stem the international drug trade.

To improve our national responses to organized international drug trafficking, there will be a controlled shift of emphasis from the transit zones to the source countries, focusing on democratic institution-building of law enforcement and judicial

institutions. We will selectively back alternative development and crop control programs when there is a strong prospect or record of success. We will emphasize assistance to international and regional institutions, such as the United Nations and Organization of American States, that conduct counternarcotics programs in support of democratic governments in such areas as legal and judicial reform, strengthening of law enforcement capabilities, and promotion of demand reduction and alternative development efforts.

Furthermore, we will sponsor projects that have regional applicability, such as law enforcement training, detection and monitoring activities, and communications systems. We will seek to involve more deeply multinational development banks and other international financial institutions in support of counternarcotics programs directed toward alternative development and judicial reform. And we will develop, where appropriate and with host country participation, integrated regional technical systems to support their own interdiction efforts.

We will concentrate drug control assistance in major producer and transit countries that have demonstrated their political will to reduce drug trafficking. Assistance programs will focus on improving judicial and policy systems, interdiction efforts, and other programs to attack the drug-trafficking infrastructure. Our goal is to improve their ability to arrest or incapacitate the leaders of drug organizations and to control money laundering and the flow of essential and precursor chemicals.² Further, we will monitor shifts in illicit production and trafficking and institute the planning required to counter these shifts.

We will continue diplomatic, public awareness, demand reduction, and other efforts with key countries whose political commitment to counternarcotics is weak. Our objective is to convince them that, as members of the global community, their full participation in the international campaign against drugs is their responsibility and is in their own national interest.

STEP TWO**Build A Global Alliance**

The urgent need to strengthen and broaden international cooperation against the global drug trade cannot be overstated. The cultivation, production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs is an increasingly global problem. The drug trade poses new trafficking challenges and threats to political and economic stability that the United States cannot confront alone. For example, criminal syndicates are taking advantage of the political turmoil in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world to expand narcotics trafficking, a move that is undermining regional progress towards democratic, social, and economic reform.

The United States will continue to lead the effort to develop an international coalition against drug cultivation, production, trafficking, and use, through multilateral organizations and initiatives, using the full range of traditional and public diplomacy tools at our disposal. Past "drug summits" created cooperative frameworks for action in the form of international treaties, regional working groups, and model legislation. Some of these efforts continue to bear fruit, but some agreements have languished. We will use established consultative groups such as the Organization of American States, the Financial Action Task Force, the Dublin Group, the International

Drug Enforcement Conference, and various United Nations and European Community efforts that have been useful in coordinating multi-national activities and in developing controls and regulations to address such problems as maritime smuggling, money laundering, and the flow and diversion of essential and precursor chemicals to source countries. We will continue efforts to strengthen the United Nations Drug Control Program that currently provides drug control assistance to 97 countries and, as coordinator of the U.N. anti-drug effort, is getting more U.N. agencies to include drug control objectives in their activities.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ For example, the Cali cartel in Colombia is an organized crime group that, by some estimates, controls over 70 percent of the world's cocaine business.
- ² The production of illicit drugs requires precursor and essential chemicals (e.g., cocaine producing chemicals include acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone, potassium permanganate, and toluene). Since most of these chemicals are not manufactured in the cocaine and heroin source countries, drug trafficking organizations must usually obtain them through international commerce.



ISBN 0-16-044397-0



